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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Hooley was convicted of aiding and abetting aggravated battery and first degree
kidnapping, and his convictions were affirmed on appeal. Over two years after his appeal
became final, Mr. Hooley, acting pro se, filed a document in the district court seeking relief in
the form of a new trial, based upon claimed Brady violations. Mr. Hooley named himself as the
plaintiff and named Gooding County and/or the State of Idaho as the defendant, but he included
the case number stemming from his underlying conviction.

The district court treated

Mr. Hooley’s filing as an untimely motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence,
and dismissed the filing, without considering its merits.
Mr. Hooley asserts that his filing, though inartfully titled, should have been treated as a
petition for post-conviction relief based upon claims of Brady violations. As such, Mr. Hooley
asserts the district court erred in failing to provide him 20 days notice prior to dismissal, giving
him the opportunity to address defects in his filing, and to present facts supporting an equitable
tolling claim.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Thomas Hooley was convicted of aiding and abetting aggravated battery and first degree
kidnapping, and his convictions were affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals. See State v.
Hooley, 2015 Unpublished Opinion, No. 741 (Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2015). The Idaho Supreme Court

1

denied Mr. Hooley’s petition for review, and issued a Remittitur on December 18, 2015.
(Augmentation.)1
On May 7, 2018, Mr. Hooley filed what he titled as a “Motion for New Trial Based on
Evidence Withheld in Violation of Brady, with attached exhibits in Support of Motion.”
(R, pp.30-208 (hereinafter, Petition).) Mr. Hooley used what appears to be a legal template
available to inmates at the Idaho State Correctional Center, and he named himself as the
“Plaintiff/Petitioner,” and “Gooding County (State)” as the “Defendant/Respondent(s).”
(R., p.30.) Mr. Hooley wrote the case number assigned to his underlying criminal case, CR2013-1732, on the blank line next to the words “CASE NO.” (R., p.30.) The body portion of the
form Mr. Hooley used includes the statement, “COMES NOW, _______, Plaintiff/Defendant
(circle one) in the above entitled,” followed by additional blank lines. (R., p.30.) Mr. Hooley
wrote “Thomas Hooley Pro Se” in the blank space after “COMES NOW,” but he did not circle
either “Plaintiff” or “Defendant.” (R., p.30.)
Though some of the pages of his petition were apparently filed out of order, Mr. Hooley
included transcripts from his underlying case and other documents, including some documents
dated in the year 2016, after Mr. Hooley’s conviction became final. (R., pp.31-187, 203-208.)
Mr. Hooley included an “Affidavit in Support of Motion,” and a section he titled, “Brady
Violation.” (R., pp.188-202.) Mr. Hooley’s basic claim was that the prosecuting attorneys
withheld evidence material to his defense. (R., pp.188-202.) He cited various United States
Supreme Court opinions recognizing that the State’s failure to disclose material evidence
favorable to the defendant is a violation of the defendant’s right to a due process, including

1

Contemporaneously with this Brief, Mr. Hooley filed a motion to augment the record with the
denial of his Petition for Review and the Remittitur issued in his prior appeal, Supreme Court
docket no. 42627. The motion to augment is pending.
2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), and Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), amongst other authorities.
Although Mr. Hooley did not cite to or rely upon Idaho Criminal Rule 34 as the basis of
his petition, three days later, the district court entered an Order Denying Motion for New Trial,
I.C.R. 34, holding that Mr. Hooley’s motion was an untimely filed motion for a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence, under that rule. (R., pp.209-211.) The district court did not
address the merits of Mr. Hooley’s claim. (R., pp.209-211.) Mr. Hooley filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. (R., pp.212-224.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err by failing to treat Mr. Hooley’s filing as a petition for post-conviction
relief based upon claimed Brady violations, and by dismissing the petition without providing
Mr. Hooley with notice of, and twenty days to correct, defects in the petition?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Failing To Treat Mr. Hooley’s Filing As A Petition For PostConviction Relief Based Upon Claimed Brady Violations, And By Dismissing The Petition
Without Providing Mr. Hooley With Notice Of, And Twenty Days To Correct, Defects In The
Petition
A.

Introduction
Thomas Hooley is a pro se litigant, untrained in the procedural nuances of Idaho law. He

filed a document claiming prosecutors withheld material evidence favorable to his defense, and
he sought relief in the form of a new trial. (R., pp.30-208.) A person claiming their criminal
conviction stems from a Brady violation2 may assert their claim in a petition for post-conviction
relief, and the one-year statute of limitations may be equitably tolled provided the petition is filed
within a “reasonable time” after discovery of the Brady violation. See Rhoades v. State, 148
Idaho 247, 250-51 (2009).
Although inartfully titled, and undesirably inclusive of his criminal case number,
Mr. Hooley’s petition adequately informed the district court that he was seeking a new trial
through a petition for post-conviction relief, not a motion for new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence. As such, the district court erred by dismissing Mr. Hooley’s petition
without providing Mr. Hooley with notice of, and 20 days to correct, defects in his petition.

2

As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, “the term ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes
used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to
any suppression of so-called ‘Brady material’—although, strictly speaking, there is never a real
‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability
that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (footnote omitted).
5

B.

The District Court Erroneously Treated Mr. Hooley’s Filing As An Untimely Motion For
New Trial Based Upon Newly Discovered Evidence
In its Order denying Mr. Hooley’s petition, the district court recognized that Mr. Hooley,

“filed a Motion for New Trial based on evidence alleged to have been held in violation of
Brady.” (R., p.219.) Despite the fact that Mr. Hooley did not cite to I.C.R. 34, the district court
treated Mr. Hooley’s motion as an untimely motion for new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence, rather than a potentially timely petition for post-conviction relief, and it dismissed the
petition. (R., pp.209-10.) The district court erred in doing so.
“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Idaho Courts recognize two after-conviction legal mechanisms by which a person may seek a
new trial when they discover they were the victim of a Brady violation. They may file a motion
for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 34(b).
See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 502-03 (2017). Alternatively, they may seek relief through
Idaho’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901, et seq, as I.C. § 19-4901(a)(1) allows a
person who claims their criminal conviction “was in violation of the constitution of the United
States” to seek redress by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. See Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900, 903-04 (2007); Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250-51 (2009). The major difference
between these two legal claims are the time limits in which they must be raised.
Under I.C.R. 34(b)(1), a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence
“must be filed within two years after final judgment.” A motion filed after the two-year limit
cannot be considered by the court. State v. Smith, 154 Idaho 581 (Ct. App. 2013). However, the
one-year statute of limitations that typically applies to petitions for post-conviction relief
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pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902, is equitably tolled until the discovery of the Brady violation, and a
petitioner in such circumstances has a “reasonable time” to file their petition after discovery of
the violation. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250-51. Applying equitable tolling prevents prosecutors
from being able to thwart a defendant’s Constitutional rights by simply continuing to suppress
Brady material until after Criminal Rule 34(b)(1)’s limitations period expires.
In deciding Mr. Hooley’s motion was filed pursuant to I.C.R. 34, the district court likely
considered the fact that Mr. Hooley wrote down the criminal case number in the blank space next
to the words “CASE NO.” in the form he filled out and filed with the court. However, including
the criminal case number in a filing is not dispositive. Idaho Courts have long recognized that
substance, not form, governs the classification of a pro se litigant’s judicial filing. In Dionne v.
State, 93 Idaho 235 (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that “[s]ubstance not form
governs,” where the petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus that would more
appropriately have been filed as application for post-conviction relief. Id. at 237. In that case,
the petitioner knowingly refused to seek relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
by refusing to allow his petition for habeas corpus to be treated as a petition for post-conviction
relief, and the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the dismissal of the habeas petition. Id. at 238.
In contrast, the district court in this case simply dismissed Mr. Hooley’s petition three days after
it was filed, and Mr. Hooley was not given any opportunity to amend his filing to delete the
criminal case number.
Mr. Hooley recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court did not follow Dionne’s substanceover-form precedent, when it declined to consider an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
to be a petition for post-conviction relief. In State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003), the Court
stated, “[b]oth habeas corpus and post-conviction relief … are civil in nature and are separate
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from criminal proceedings.” Id. at 355 (citing State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9–10 (1998)). The
Jakoski Court concluded, “[i]t would be too much of a stretch to hold that a motion filed in a
criminal case can be considered as a pleading commencing civil litigation.” Id. This case,
however, is not like Jakoski.
In Jakoski, the defendant had previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which
was denied by the district court and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 354. The
defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) and the district
court denied the motion on its merits. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
ruling, with all three judges writing separate opinions providing different reasons for doing so.
Id. The Supreme Court granted review and described the issue as “whether the district court had
jurisdiction to consider Jakoski’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id. The Court ultimately
held that the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely filed under Criminal
Rule 33(c), and the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider it. Id. at 355. The Court
then refused to consider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea as a petition for post-conviction
relief.
Importantly, the facts described in the Jakoski opinion give every indication that the
defendant in that case understood the difference between a petition for post-conviction relief and
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant had previously filed a petition for postconviction relief and appealed its denial. Id. at 354. Only later did the defendant file his
Criminal Rule 33(c) motion. Id. Furthermore, there is no indication that the defendant in
Jakoski was simply confused when he filed his motion; to the contrary, there is every indication
the defendant knew he was filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but did not know that the
Idaho Supreme Court would interpret I.C.R. 33(c) as placing a jurisdictional limit on when such
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a motion could be filed. Id. at 354-55. The argument that the Court should consider his filing a
petition for post-conviction relief was an alternative argument to his claim that the district court
had jurisdiction to consider the merits of his I.C.R. 33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.
at 355-56.
Mr. Hooley’s case differs significantly. First, there is no indication that Mr. Hooley
intended his petition to be considered a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence, pursuant to I.C.R. 34. He did not cite to that rule in his petition, and he did not argue
he met the test applied to such motions as described in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976).
(R., pp.30, 188-202.) On the contrary, Mr. Hooley argued the standards used to determine
whether a Brady violation compels a new trial. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized
that “[a] Brady claim is quite distinct from a request for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence,” and the standards of review articulated by the United States Supreme Court for
reviewing Brady claims apply, not the Drapeau standards. Lankford, 162 Idaho at 502-03.
Additionally, Mr. Hooley described himself as the “Plaintiff/Petitioner” and “Gooding
County (State),” as the “Defendant/Respondent(s),” which is consistent with how postconviction petitions should be titled. (R., p.30.) While Mr. Hooley did not cite to I.C. § 19-4901
and did not use the words “petition for post-conviction relief,” he also did not cite to I.C.R. 34 or
use the words “motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.” (R., pp.30-208.)
Idaho Courts have long recognized that pro se litigants may not include the necessary
information in their court filings because they simply don’t have an understanding of what is
required.

See, e.g., Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001) (superseded by statute as

recognized in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004)) (recognizing that petitions for post-
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conviction relief filed by pro se litigants will often be inadequate due to the petitioner’s lack of
legal training).
The only indications Mr. Hooley’s petition could be interpreted as a motion for new trial
pursuant to Criminal Rule 34, instead of a petition for post-conviction relief, are that he included
his criminal case number instead of leaving that space blank, and the first words of the title of his
petition were “Motion for New Trial.” (R., p.30.) Everything else, including describing himself
as the petitioner and the State as the defendant, the full title of his petition being “Motion for
New Trial Based on Evidence Withheld in violation of Brady, with attached exhibits in Support
of Motion,” and, most importantly, the substance of his claim being alleged Brady violations, all
indicate that Mr. Hooley inartfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief, based upon claimed
Brady violations. (R., pp.30-208.) The district court erred when it failed to heed the Brown
Court’s admonition and considered Mr. Hooley’s pro se petition as an untimely motion brought
pursuant to I.C.R. 34.

C.

The District Court Erred By Failing To Grant Mr. Hooley Twenty Days To Correct
Deficiencies In His Petition
Admittedly, Mr. Hooley’s petition had some flaws but that is not to be unexpected from

someone untrained in the law. See Brown, 135 Idaho at 679. Most notably, Mr. Hooley did not
provide any information as to when he discovered the alleged Brady violations, in order for him
to invoke the “reasonable time” standard applicable to determine whether equitable tolling
should apply. See Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250-51.
Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) provides the following:
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion,
and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no
purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties
its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant
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shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal.
In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the application
dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the
proceedings otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not
proper if there exists a material issue of fact.
I.C. §19-4906(b). “[I]n giving notice of intent to deny [a petition for post-conviction relief], ‘the
court should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the
petitioner to supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist.’”
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). The district court erred by
dismissing Mr. Hooley’s petition without first filing a notice of intent to dismiss, providing
Mr. Hooley with information about the defects in his petition, and 20 days to respond.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hooley respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
dismissing his petition, and remand his case to the district court with instructions that the court
enter a notice of intent to dismiss, providing Mr. Hooley with 20 days to address the defects in
his petition.
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2018.

/s/ Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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